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What it is like to be a Dialetheia
The Ontology of True Contradictions 
According to Dialetheism some contradictions (p&~p) are true. What would the world be like
if this were the case? Radically indeterminate, according to a venerable answer. This follows
from a tacit conflation of the principle of contradiction (PNC) with the Principle of Identity
(PI). Accordingly, transcendental arguments (elenchos) purport to show the unassailability
of PNC by showing the unassailability of PI. We agree that if PI were to fail, PNC would fail
too; but this is not the only way in which PNC might fail. Dialetheias are two-footed creatures
in that their truth requires the existence of two conflicting facts: one making p true, the
other making ~p true. Our answer to the question is that PNC can fail also if the world is over-
determinate, rather than in-determinate. We conclude that Dialetheism lives and dies with
the prospects of a positive account of negative truths. 
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1. Introduction
In his Metaphysics, Gamma, Aristotle put forward what is perhaps the
most famous and thorough formulation and defense of the principle of
contradiction (PNC). In its ontological formulation, the principle says
that “For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultane-
ously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible (Met.,
1005b, 18-20; tr. Kirwan). Its logical variant affirms that “The opinion
that opposite assertions are not simultaneously true is the firmest of all”
(Met, 1011b, 13-14).
As scholars have pointed out, various formulations of the PNC are
found in Aristotle’s works, not all of which converge. Starting at least
from Łukasiewicz’s analyses (1910, 1971), subsequently elaborated by
others, it is customary to distinguish the ontological formulations (which
refer to things and their characteristics), from the semantic ones (which
refer to the notions of true and false), logical-syntactic, psychological (it
is impossible to explicitly think of something contradictory), and prag-
matic (in real life we  guard against dangers). Furthermore, even the fa-
mous canonical formulation actually seems to incorporate two distinct
laws: what we would call today, respectively, the law of contradiction and
the law of the excluded middle, integrating them into an overarching
principle that has been dubbed the ‘principle of contradictory pairs’.
Since the purpose of this essay is not historical, we can leave aside the ex-
amination of the various Aristotelian passages and stick to what tradition
has handed down as the canonical formulation of the principle1. As it is
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1 On the complexity of Aristotelian formulations of the principle of non-contradic-
tion, see, in addition to the classical works of Łukasiwicz (1910, 1971), the exten-
sive essay by W. Cavini (2007-8), as well as E. Severino (2005), part I.
most often done, we shall take the ontological, or object-theoretic for-
mulation to mean that:
[PNC] For any object, it is impossible that the same characteristic be-
long and does not belong to it at the same time.
Very few philosophers took seriously the idea that the principle may
be false, since questioning it threatens to blow a fatal strike at the heart
of rational thinking itself. It is unfortunate that the few philosophers who
took up the challenge of denying it – most notably Heraclitus and, ac-
cording to some interpretations, Hegel – are among the most obscure
and cryptic thinkers of all times. The logician and philosopher Graham
Priest, in more recent times, devoted a good part of his career to the her-
culean task of raising the vague contention that (some) contradictions
might be true to the highest standards of clarity and analytic thinking.
He calls the view that some contradictions are true Dialetheism, and true
contradictions themselves Dialetheias. 
This unprecedented accomplishment was made possible, among oth-
er things, by the discovery and development of logical systems that block
the Principle of Explosion (ex contraditione quodlibet), according to
which from a contradiction any proposition whatsoever can be legiti-
mately deduced. These systems, known as paraconsistent logics, opened
the way for a non-trivial treatment of true contradictions, or dialetheias.
One paraconsistent logic that is particularly apt for this purpose is the so-
called Logic of Paradox (LP), introduced by Priest in his (Priest, 1979).
The general question that we shall try to answer in this paper is: what
must reality be like (in general) for the PNC to hold, and what must it
be like for the principle to fail? In other words, what commitments about
the general ontological structure of the world come with the endorse-
ment (and with the denial) of the PNC? 
A few clarifying remarks are in order. In general, when one speaks of
the ‘ontological structure of the world’, one intends to refer to reality and
its internal articulation. Reality, in this sense, is whatever makes truths
true. The intuition behind this notion is that truths are true in virtue of
something which exists, or, as it is sometimes said with a slogan: truth de-
pends on being.
Throughout my philosophical development […] I have retained,
in spite of changes, certain fundamental beliefs, which I do not
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know how to demonstrate, but which I cannot bring myself to
doubt. The first of these, which seems so obvious that I should
blush to mention it but for the circumstance that the contrary
opinion has been maintained, is that ‘truth’ depends upon some
kind of relation to ‘fact’. (Russell, 1959: 117)
There are countless ways to spell out this realist intuition. Philoso-
phers of realist inclination are divided on a number of questions. Which
are the primary bearers of truth values? Sentences? Thoughts? Judge-
ments? Propositions? What kinds of things make truths true? Facts? Ob-
jects? States of affairs? Tropes? It is common usage to call a thing whose
existence makes a truth true, whatever it is, a truth-maker. A truth-maker
is that in virtue of which something (a truth-bearer) is true. There is dis-
agreement about what kind of relation (if it is a relation) obtains between
truths and their truth-bearers, but it is generally recognised that it is a
trans-categorial asymmetric relation which obtains between something
which exists and a truthbearer. The relation is ‘trans-categorial’ in that,
generally, truth-makers are not themselves truth-bearers or truth-apt.
The view that (at least) certain kinds of truth require something to make
them true is known as the Truth-maker Principle. 
A further question that divides philosophers and that is relevant for us
is the exact scope of the truth-maker principle. This is the question of
which kinds of truths require a truth-makers. All truths? Or only some
particular kinds of them? Only contingent truth? Only particular truths?
Only positive truth? At the maximalist end of the spectrum one finds the
view that all truths require a truth-maker:
[Truth-maker Maximalism] “A truth, any truth, should depend for
its truth for something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of which it is true” (Arm-
strong, 2004: 7).
Various authors have objected on various grounds that this principle
is too inclusive2. Wittgenstein, for example, maintained that tautologies
(contradictions) are not made true (false) by anything. He, and Russell
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2 Theories of truth-making which limit the scope of the maximalist principle are col-
lectively known as ‘truth-maker optimalism’ (see MacBride, 2020).
too, also argued that ‘molecular truths’ (truth of the kind: ‘the rose is red
and scented’) do not require proprietary truth-makers, over and above
the truth-makers for their conjuncts. Some have argued that only contin-
gent truths require truth-makers. Others contended that general truths
(e.g. ‘all men are mortal’) do not require truth-makers over and above the
singular truths that make them true. Finally, and most importantly for
our concerns, is the question of negative truths. A positive claim is a claim
that an object has a certain (positive) characteristic, such as the claim that
a particular rose is red. Negative claims are the negation of positive ones,
such as the claim that a given rose is not red3. The question of interest to
us is whether negative truths require truth-makers, over and above the
fact that their correlative positive propositions (‘the rose is red’) lack a
truth-maker. At the opposite, degenerate end of the truth-maker spec-
trum, finally, one finds the view that no truth requires a truth-maker (e.g.
Dodd, 2007).
Now we are in the position to clarify the question that we wish to ask.
To each answer to the above questions there correspond a different view
of what the world (or reality) is like. Although we shall mention several
arguments in favour and against some views of truthmaking, here we
shall not argue for or against any of these options. We shall limit our sur-
vey of positions to the various scopes that the truth-maker principle
might take. Our question is rather: which theories of truth-making are
hospitable, and which inhospitable, to Dialetheism? Or, equivalently: if
there were dialetheias, what must their truth-makers be like? 
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3 It has been often noted that there might not be a syntactic characterization of this
distinction. Some syntactically positive claims are patently negative, as for example
the claims that a given rose is odourless, or that a man is blind. Others are overtly
negative, but conceptually positive, as for example the claim that a man is not blind.
However, it is generally recognised that there is a (conceptual) distinction to be
made, at least in most cases. The claim that there are Arctic penguins is made true
by actual Arctic penguins. But the claim that there aren’t Antarctic penguins is made
true by… what? An absence of penguins?
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2. The Principle of Contradiction and the determinacy of the world
A) The classical answer: an incoherent world is an indeterminate world
To answer our question we shall start by considering and critically eval-
uating Aristotle’s own answer, as well as that of the Italian philosopher
Emanuele Severino. Both philosophers agree that the denier of PNC is
committed to the view that things are radically “indeterminate” (aorista).
In general, these advocates of the PNC claim that the determinacy of
things (in the broad sense of the term) stands and falls with it. For this
reason, they think that the PNC is a necessary condition for the possibil-
ity of thought and language.
The notion that things are determinate (hōrismena) has been variously
elucidated. Aristotle, for example, characterized the view that things are
indeterminate as the view that things are not unitary (1007b26), in con-
trast with his own view (1006a 31-4, b7-10); or as the view that things do
not have an essence (1007a 20-21), in contrast with his view (1006a32-
34); or as the view that things are not definable, rather than definable
(1012a 21f.) (on this and on the notion of indeterminacy in Aristotle’s, see
Politis, 2004: 147). This characterization exposed the Aristotelian defense
of PNC to some criticisms, since it would presuppose unwarranted as-
sumptions, such as the theory of substance, essentialism, etc., which are
somewhat questionable. Be that as it may, the core of this idea can be re-
formulated in the following way, which aligns with Severino’s understand-
ing of the PNC (we shall call this the Principle of Ontic Determinacy):
[POD] Everything is what it is and it is how it is, and it is neither another
thing, nor it is different from how it is.
This principle has often been unpacked into a positive and a negative
part: the so-called Principle of Identity (PI) and the Principle of Double
Negation (PDN) respectively:
[PI] Everything is what it is and how it is. (Sometimes confusingly for-
mulated as: A=A)
[PDN] No thing is what it is not (sometimes formulated as: A is not A)
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B) The elenchos
Both Aristotle and Severino agree that the PNC is too fundamental to be
susceptible of a proof in the standard sense. However, they both think
that the principle can be “shown” to be universally valid by showing that
its deniers must use it and hence presuppose it in order to even express
their denial. This sort of transcendental reasoning, known as the elenchos,
comes in various flavors but its general strategy is this. First, to argue that
the denier of PNC is eo ipso a denier of POD, and then move on to argue
that the denier of POD cannot even univocally express this denial with-
out using the principle. To better appreciate how the elenchos is supposed
to work, consider the following reconstruction of Aristotle’s 1006b18-34
offered by Politis (2004: 147):
P1. PNC is not true of things if, and only if, things are indeterminate. 
P2. If things are indeterminate, then it is impossible to think and speak
about things. 
P3. It is possible to think and speak about things. Therefore, 
C. It is not the case that PNC is not true of things; i.e. PNC is true of
things.
In this section we shall discuss how proposition P1 should be inter-
preted and the virtues of some arguments put forward in favor of it. After
a brief historical interlude (sec. C), we shall consider Łukasiewicz’s objec-
tions to the classical integration of PNC and POD (sec. D) and then
mention some considerations which mitigate his severe conclusion that
the conflation is based on a confusion (sec. E-G).
C) A brief history of the principles of identity and non-contradiction
The view that the PNC is equivalent to, if not synonymous, with POD
was not new in Aristotle’s times. Parmenides famously claimed that those
who, like perhaps Heraclitus, deny that reality conforms with the PNC,
are “dazed, undiscriminating hordes [who believe] that to be and not to
be are the same and not the same” (From fr. 6; see G.S. Kirk et al., eds.,
1983, 247). This view as to the equivalence of the PNC and the POD
had a long standing influence on most subsequent Western philosophers,
and it remained the (often unargued for) received view at least until the
development of modern logic. 
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The POD seems to be the result of an integration – or, critics would
say, of a confusion – between the laws of contradiction and identity. In-
deed, scholars have shown how the law of identity, which Aristotle did not
explicitly formulate, first flanked and then absorbed the law of non-con-
tradiction, starting from the Middle Ages up to the metaphysics of the
moderns. We give here only some examples. Aquinas believed that, in the
order of knowledge, the principle of contradiction followed from the ap-
prehension of the self-identity of entities: “Our intellect, therefore, knows
being [ens] naturally, and whatever essentially belongs to a being as such;
and upon this knowledge is founded the knowledge of first principles,
such as the impossibility of simultaneously affirming and denying, and
the like” (S.c.G. II, c. 83, 31). Along similar lines, Antonius Andreae, a
pupil of Scotus, referred to the principle of identity as a foundation of
PNC: “I say that this principle: ‘it is impossible that the same thing simul-
taneously be and not be’, is not absolutely first, that is, firstly first. [...] if
you ask which is the first complex […] I say that it is this: ‘an entity is an
entity [ens est ens]’” (Antonius Andreae, quoted by Göldel, 1935: 72).
Leibniz, in his second letter to Clarke, claimed that “The great foun-
dation of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or of identity, that
is to say that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time; and
that thus A is A and not non-A.” (Leibniz, Clarke, 2000, p. 7). Kant, in an
important pre-critical essay, after denying that there can be a single
supreme principle, states that “there are two absolutely first principles of
all truths. One of them is the principle of affirmative truths, namely the
proposition: whatever is, is; the other is the principle of negative truths,
namely the proposition: whatever is not, is not. These two principles tak-
en together are commonly called the principle of identity” (Kant, 1992:
7). Kant subsequently changed this formulation, reaching the canonical
one, which is found in the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which:
“the proposition that no predicate pertains to a thing that contradicts it
is called the principle of contradiction” (B 190, Kant, 1998: 279). Final-
ly, although it is controversial whether or not Hegel endorses the princi-
ple of non-contradiction, it is certain that he follows the formulations of
modern metaphysics, and in particular the Kantian distinction according
to which the principle of identity is articulated in the positive form (A =
A) and in the negative one, also called the principle of contradiction, so
that A cannot be together A and non-A (see Hegel, 2010: 360).
To sum up, the historically received answer to our question about the
ontological commitments of Dialetheism is that it is committed to the
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view that things are radically indeterminate, or, equivalently, to the view
that the Principle of Identity is false. We agree with Aristotle and Severi-
no that the view that things are radically indeterminate is implicitly com-
mitted to trivialism: the claim that everything is true. And we also agree
that if dialetheism was committed to trivialism it would be self-defeating.
However, there is another option open for the dialetheist. This is the view
that things are over-determinate in the sense that incoherent facts can de-
terminately coexist. If we are right, this makes elenchtic arguments of the
kind mentioned above insufficient to show the universal validity of the
PNC (beyond the scope of the determinacy of all things, including states
of affairs).
To anticipate, the thrust of our criticism is that these transcendental
arguments prove the determinateness of the various parts of reality (the
truth-makers) but not that these parts must necessarily cohere.
D) Łukasiewicz’s objection: is the conflation of the principles based on a
confusion?
Before discussing our view, let us dispel some potential misunderstand-
ings. To a modern mind, the claim that the PNC, in either its ontological
or logical formulation, is equivalent to or even synonymous with the Prin-
ciple of Identity (or of Double Negation) will sound straightforwardly
false, or at best confused. There is, in fact, a patent difference of logical
form between the PNC and the POD. As Łukasiewicz once noticed: “The
principle of identity is different from the law of contradiction. The prin-
ciple of contradiction cannot be formulated without the concepts of nega-
tion and logical multiplication, which are expressed in the words ‘and at
the same time’; while the principle of identity holds very well without re-
course to those concepts.” (Łukasiewicz, 1971: 494). In another, more ex-
tended analysis of Aristotle’s treatment of contradiction, Łukasiewicz puts
forward an argument to the effect that the PNC is neither synonymous
nor equivalent to the PI. It is worth quoting him in full:
The principle of identity affirms that if [an object] K has b, then
it has b, and if at the same time it does not have b, then it does not
have b. From these propositions one cannot deduce that K cannot
simultaneously have b and not have b. The principle of contradic-
tion therefore does not follow from either the principle of double
negation or from the principle of identity. It follows a fortiori that
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neither of the latter principles is synonymous or equivalent to the
former. (Łukasiewicz, 1910: 64, our translation from Italian)
While these considerations appear rather unassailable in their simplic-
ity, we disagree with Łukasiewicz on his diagnosis of the once ubiquitous
conflation of the two principles: 
Philosophical logic simply had no appreciation for the finer con-
ceptual distinctions because it did not operate with sharply delin-
eated concepts and unambiguously determined symbols; rather it
sank into the swamp of the fluid and vague speech used in every-
day life (Łukasievicz, 1971: 494).
Some mitigating considerations are in order and are relevant for what
follows. We shall concentrate on the case of Leibniz and Severino, but
analogous considerations could be made about most of the authors that
we cited.
E) First mitigating consideration: Leibniz conception of truth as identity
As we have said, Leibniz gives several formulations of PNC. Some are
canonical in modern terms, such as4
[PNC1] “For any proposition p, p is not both true and false”.
Others are much closer to what we have called de Principle of Identity:
[PNC2] “For any proposition p, if p is an identical proposition, then p
is true”.
Now, is it plausible to think that Leibniz did not have the conceptual
distinctions that are required to see that PNC1 is not an identical propo-
sition? We think not. As many have noted, there are several ways to ex-
plain Leibniz’s conflation of PNC1 and PNC2, short of questioning his
clarity of mind. First, Leibniz (as Severino) held a view according to
which all truths, including contingent ones are identities, in the sense
that the predicate is contained explicitly or implicitly in the concept of
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the subject. The truths that are not patently identical, according to this
view, can be reduced to identities by analysis and definitions. The differ-
ence between contingent and necessary truths concerns the finite vs infi-
nite number of steps of such demonstrations. 
In what appears to be a transcendental argument for PNC not dissim-
ilar from Aristotle’s and Severino’s, Leibniz claims that the principle is
presupposed by any rational thinking, since otherwise one would be able
to defend the opposite of what one is defending. Now, given the view
that all demonstration is a reduction to the identity between the predi-
cate and a part of the complete concept of the subject, it is easy to see
why he should think that no demonstration would be possible if PNC2
were false (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2018). 
It is very important for our purposes to consider how Leibniz thought
that PNC1, which is patently not an identity, might be reduced to one.
Leibniz (Ibid.) notices that if we define ‘False’ as ‘Not true’, PNC1 turns
into an identity of truth-values:
[PNC3] “For any proposition p, p is not both true and not true”. 
This is of paramount importance for our concerns since, as we shall
see, the prospect for dialetheism hinges on the possibility to distinguish
False from Non-True. 
F) Second mitigating consideration: from inconsistency to non-identity via
indiscernibles
As a second mitigating consideration, it is worth noting that assuming
the plausible principle that if things have different properties they cannot
be identical, it follows that any violation of PNC1 would eo ipso consti-
tute a violation of PNC2. The converse of Leibniz’s principle of identity
of indiscernible, sometimes called the Principle of Indiscernibility of
Identicals, affirms that x=y →(Fx⟷Fy). By contraposition one gets the
principle that if ~(Fx⟷Fy), then it cannot be true that x and y are iden-
tical: ~(Fx⟷Fy)→x≠y.Now, a violation of PNC1 takes the form  (Fx&-Fx),
from which one derives ~(Fx⟷Fx). A simple application of the principle
of indiscernibility of identicals then entails that if one is prepared to
countenance violations of PNC1, one must thereby also countenance a
violation of the PI. This is interesting for us since the above considera-
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tions appear to vindicate the view according to which the PNC could on-
ly fail if the world was indeterminate (aorista)5. 
G) Third mitigating consideration: Severino’s Principle of Identity
As regards Severino’s position more specifically, it is certainly true that his
formulation of the PNC (‘Being is not not-Being’, or: ‘the positive is not
the negative’, see Severino, 2016: 56) is unusual in the eyes of contem-
poraries. It might seem that he has only in view the principle of self-iden-
tity of things, x=x, which concerns the identity function expressed by the
verb to be, rather than its function as copula or of as predication involved
in the PNC. This is partly true, in the sense that for Severino self-identity
and the PNC are cognate, being integrated in the POD (see, also for Sev-
erino’s interpretation of Aristotele, Severino 2005: part I, esp. 33ff., 69).
Yet, Severino’s principle “Being is not not-Being” is general enough to
encompass all the specific senses of the verb ‘to be’: identity, copula and
existence. Nonetheless, one can still be perplexed about the fact that a vi-
olation of the usual PNC (e.g. the cat is and is not on the sofa) would
constitute per se also a violation of the principle of self-identity6.
Why saying that the cat is and is not on the sofa is a violation of self-
identity? Of what with what? The cat is the cat and the sofa is the sofa,
even in cases where the cat could contradictorily be and not be on the so-
fa. In his contribution to this volume, Priest moves precisely this objec-
tion to Severino: that it is not true that a contradiction involves a seman-
tic collapse for which different things (individuals, universals) would be
identified. “That something is F and not F does not entail that either the
universals F-ness and (not-F)-ness, or their extension, are identical” (§
3.1). Or again: “Even if A&¬A is true A means, in general, something
different from ¬A.” (§ 3.4). A detailed answer should consider not only
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5 As we have already said, we disagree with Aristotle and Severino that the only way
in which the PNC could fail is if the world was indeterminate (we shall argue that
it can also fail by being over-determinate). The point we wish to make here, how-
ever, is that the association of the two principles cannot be dismissed as easily as
Łukasievicz thought. 
6 Incidentally, this relation between the PNC and self-identity is the pivotal point of
Severino’s defence of the PNC (See Severino, 2016: 64 ff.), directed against the par-
tial denier of the PNC, as a dialetheist might be.
Returning to Parmenides (Severino 2016: sec. 6), but also Severino’s anal-
ysis of many Aristotelian passages concerning the PNC and the notion of
truth. It is not possible, however, to undertake this task here, due to lack
of space (See Severino, 2005: 30-34). We limit ourselves to sketch a for-
mulation that seems to us to express the gist of Severino’s theoretical and
exegetical arguments.
One can use a spatial metaphor, as Wittgenstein did. A spatial object
(say two-dimensional, for convenience) has recognizable boundaries,
that is, it is determined by a figure which distinguishes the object from
what it is not. Now, what about a proposition and its denial? Wittgen-
stein (in some writings preceding the Tractatus) assimilated predicates to
lines that divide a plane in two parts, and names to points that lie on one
side or the other (See Wittgenstein, 1969: 100). In another passage, he
similarly compared a proposition to a vertical line that bisects the (logi-
cal) space: “the form of a proposition is like a straight line which divides
all points of a plane into right and left” (Ibid. 97). Wittgenstein will not
fully retain this metaphor in the Tractatus; yet, it remains useful for pre-
sent purposes. An object has a shape, has contours that identify it; anal-
ogously, also a state of affairs, a fact has contours in logical space: the line
of Wittgenstein’s metaphor, which distinguishes the left and right points
representing, respectively, affirmation and negation. Understanding the
meaning of a proposition is seeing this outline in logical space; it is con-
trasting one half of the plane with the remaining one. A contradiction,
in this metaphor, cancels the line, because it jointly considers both the
partitions that that line should divide. In this sense, no more determinate
figure is left, logical space is no longer bisected and it turns out to be in-
determinate. In other words: self-identity, both of objects and of states of
affairs, is their having “boundaries”. This is the alleged common root of
both self-identity and the PNC. If these fall, their identity (i.e. the nu-
merical identity of things, the numerical identity of states of affairs) is
lost and the world turns out to be indeterminate.
Now, all that was said does not vindicate the view that the PNC is
equivalent or synonymous with the POD (unless one is prepared to buy
Leibniz’s and Severino’s peculiar analysis of contingency); nor that the
PNC can be shown to be universally valid by showing that POD is uni-
versally valid. However, we think that these considerations show that the
two principles are intimately related, and that care must be taken if the
dialetheist wishes to resist committing to the indeterminacy of the world. 
Summing up, while there is a grain of truth in the Aristotelian view
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that the PNC and the PI are intimately related, we agree with
Łukasiewicz that such relation is less intimate than the Aristotelian de-
fender of the PNC may have hoped for. The lesson we wish to draw from
Łukasiewicz’s observations is twofold. 
H) Our thesis: how to build a dialetheia
Firstly, we shall argue that the ontological ground of true contradictions
(if there are any), i.e. their truth-makers, reflect their superficial logical
form, α&β, even more than one can think at first glance. Dialetheias, so
to speak, are necessarily two-footed creatures in the sense that the ground
for their truth must consist in the obtaining of two ontologically deter-
mined and mutually independent facts: one making p true, the other
making~p true (or, equivalently, p false). Thus, in a sense, our answer to
the question of how reality must be like if dialetheism is true will be that
it must be over-determinate, rather than in-determinate. That these con-
tradictory facts conform to the PI (or, equivalently, of POD), that is, that
they determinately exist and have the characteristics that they have, we
shall see, is essential for the existence of a dialetheia: if either fact was not
determinately existing, if either was not definitively what it is and as it is,
it could not fulfil the truthmaking role that it is called to play. 
Secondly, we shall argue that whether one should be prepared to ad-
mit (some) true contradictions or not depends on one’s view of what
makes negative truths true. In particular, we shall see that the view ac-
cording to which negative claims are made true by the mere absence (i.e.
non existence) of a truth-maker for the positive claim are highly inhos-
pitable to dialetheism. The account of negative truths that will emerge as
most hospitable to dialetheism, we shall see, is the opposition account
(sec. 6-9).
3. The tractarian view of negative truths and why it is inhospitable
to dialetheism
Let us start by considering if one could take Łukasiewicz’s observations
as direct evidence for our thesis that dialetheias are essentially two-footed
creatures. Contradictions, the argument goes, are essentially of the formp&~p. Therefore, if (contingent) propositions are made true by corre-
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sponding states of affairs, or facts, a contradiction can be made true only
by the existence of two facts, making respectively p and ~p true. 
Most likely this argument will strike our reader as a non sequitur. Even
granting that all positive (contingent) claims must be made true by ded-
icated parts of reality, and therefore that any proposition of the kind  p&q
(where p and q are logically independent propositions) must be made
true by the existence of two such facts, why concede that this is the case
also for pairs of contradictory propositions? If a proposition is made true
(by a fact), isn’t its negation automatically made (only) false by the exis-
tence of that very fact? As Russell (1919: 4) once put it, “there is implant-
ed in the human breast an almost unquenchable desire to find some way
of avoiding the admission that negative facts are as ultimate as those that
are positive”.
One clear statement of this conception of propositions and of their re-
lation to reality can be found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0621) “It is
important that ‘p’ and ‘-p’ can say the same thing. For it shows that noth-
ing in reality corresponds to the sign ‘-’. As Simons (2008: 14) aptly put
it: “This is the truth-maker end of Wittgenstein’s insight that proposi-
tions are bi-polar: if a proposition has one truth-value, however it gets it,
its contradictory opposite has the opposite truth-value without further
ado”. This mechanism (which Simons calls “truth by default”) by which
a negative proposition gets its truth-value “for free”, so to speak, is sup-
posed to explain how negative claims can be true (or false) without cor-
responding to proprietary, positively existing facts: “it seems more ade-
quate to regard sentences of the given kind as true not in virtue of any
truth-maker of their own, but simply in virtue of the fact that the corre-
sponding positive sentences have no truth-maker” (Mulligan, Simons,
Smith, 1984: 315). 
Before discussing the difficulties of this intuitive picture of false-mak-
ing, let us make some of its consequences explicit. An obvious conse-
quence, as Stevens (2008) noticed, is that if a dialetheist were to adhere
to this tractarian picture she would have to countenance situations in
which reality simultaneously contains and does not contain the very
same fact (as opposed to containing two facts opposing each other).
Now, it is interesting for our purposes to notice that this comes close to
admitting that the dialetheist is committed to the indeterminacy of the
world, as Aristotle and Severino contend: whether a fact belongs to real-
ity or not would not be an absolute matter. As we shall argue, however,
the dialetheist should do well to stay away from such concession.
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Notice, in fact, that the truth of either p or ~p is essential for making
the molecular proposition p&~p true. Therefore, to the extent to which
the truth of ~p entails that the truthmaker for p does not exist (and vice
versa), it also entails that p&~p is only false, and hence not a dialetheia at
all. Put differently, if the only way in which reality can make one of the
conjuncts p or ~p true is by failing to produce a truth-maker for the oth-
er, then it will never yield a truth-maker for the contradiction p&~p. If
we are right, the prospects for dialetheism live and die with the prospect
of resisting this tractarian picture of truthmaking and false-making.
Priest (2006: 51) admits that this is the case: “A correspondence theory
of truth requires an account of [truth-makers]. One of the most sophis-
ticated accounts ever given is undoubtedly that of Wittgenstein’s Tracta-
tus. And certainly, according to this, there are no contradictory facts”.
There are also more recent attempts to satisfy the desire to do without
negative facts. The idea, also known as Truth-maker Optimalism, and of-
ten advertised with the slogan ‘truth supervenes on being’, is to suppose
that negative states of affairs merely supervene (rather than depend) on
positive ones, and to build the truthmaking relation on this superve-
nience relation. This is the truthmaking principle that ensues:
[Truth supervenes on being] “If something is true then it would not
be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist
which don’t, or else certain things had not existed which do” (Bigelow,
1988: 133).
In short, as it happens in the tractarian view, negative (and general)
truths would be true not because some positive truth-makers exist, but
because “they lack false-makers” (Lewis, 1992: 216, 2001: 610). All these
variants of the tractarian view are equally hostile to Dialetheism.
4. Breaking Wittgenstein’s dream
A) Living without negative facts
Fortunately for the dialetheist, however, the tractarian view is deeply
problematic. Shortly after commenting on our unquenchable desire to
do without negative facts, Russell observes that:
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There might be an attempt to substitute for a negative fact the
mere absence of a fact. If A loves B, it may be said, that is a good
substantial fact; while if A does not love B, that merely expresses
the absence of a fact composed of A and loving and B, and by no
means involves the actual existence of a negative fact. But the ab-
sence of a fact is itself a negative fact; it is the fact that there is not
such a fact as A loving B. Thus, we cannot escape from negative
facts in this way (1919: 4-5).
The belief that truth must depend somehow on some relations with
the facts stems from the observation that the mere existence of a thing
and of a property does not suffice for making it true that that thing has
that property. Something more is needed to explain how reality makes it
true that the property is instantiated. The gist of Russell’s objection is
that the mere existence of the object and of the property are not suffice
to make it true that the object does not have the property either. Reality
must make its positive contribution either way, as it were. 
It should be clear that the view that truth supervenes on reality is
equally exposed to to this sort of objection. Martin, for example, has ob-
jected to Bigelow’s optimalism (in a Russellian spirit) that the statement
that something is absent is itself a negative statement in need of truth-
making, and that for this reason it “can’t be used to explain or show how
[a negative truth] needs no truth-making state of the world for it to be
true” (Martin, 1996: 61). 
Bigelow’s theory has a further problem. While the above condition cer-
tainly states a necessary condition for any realist theory of truthmaking,
many have objected that it cannot also state a sufficient condition. Molnar,
for example, objected to this view on the grounds that “[t]ruthmaker the-
ory is a theory of the groundedness of truth-values. Minimally, such a the-
ory should enable one to identify whatever it is that explains why the
truth-bearers have the truth-values they have” (Molnar, 2000: 82).
The problem is that the theory merely specifies that if a proposition
is true in a world and false in another, there must be something that exists
in one but not in the other or vice versa. Molnar’s objection is that the
view does not specify what this something is. For example, the truth that
there is no wine on the table, intuitively, must be made true by some-
thing that has to do with wine, not just by anything. The worry is that in
an attempt to specify this condition of relevance the view would relapse
into some more maximalist theory. It has also been argued, finally, that
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the supervenience version of the truth-maker principle makes the rela-
tion of truthmaking symmetrical, which flies in the face of the intuition
that it is reality which grounds (and determines) truth, not vice versa.
Here we shall not take a definite stance about these theories of truth-
making. We content ourselves with the observation that, if some variant
of it turns out to be the correct account of negative truths, then so much
the worse for the dialetheist friend of truth-makers.
B) The Achilles’ heel of the Tractatus: formal and material incompatibility
The tractarian project runs into further difficulties precisely at the junc-
ture where dialetheism may find its logical space. As Wittgenstein soon
realised, not all potentially contradictory proposition are of the form
p&~p, nor would be ultimately reducible to propositions of this form.
Wittgenstein’s project to reduce all alethic contradictions into truth-
functional ones had to confront the problem of empirical incompatibil-
ities, which turned out to be so intractable that Wittgenstein was later
driven to abandon the tractarian project altogether. The claim that a giv-
en patch in the visual field is wholly blue and wholly red, for example, is
contradictory, since it entails that it is both blue and not blue. Now,
while the latter claim is certainly a transparent contradiction, what
would make it true (if indeed this was a dialetheia) would be two positive
states of affairs: that the patch is blue and that it is red. If things were so,
reality would be making a contradiction true not by being indeterminate
as to which facts belong to it (i.e. in the sense that one and the same fact
both exists and does not exist), but, on the contrary, by being over-deter-
minate, i.e. by determinately containing two facts that – though existen-
tially independent from each other –, mutually oppose each other. The
patch could be either only red or only blue, without one fact presuppos-
ing, implying or requiring the existence of the other. In an early com-
mentary on the Tractatus, Ramsey appears to be acutely aware of this
problem:
Mr. Wittgenstein admits that a point in the visual field cannot be
both red and blue; and, indeed, otherwise, since he thinks induc-
tion has no logical basis, we should have no reason for thinking that
we may not come upon a visual point which is both red and blue.
Hence he says that “This is both red and blue” is a contradiction.
This implies that the apparently simple concepts red, blue (suppos-
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ing us to mean by those words absolutely specific shades) are really
complex and formally incompatible (Ramsey, 1923: 473).
It is instructive to notice that Wittgenstein appears also to be aware of
the problem, since he attempts (unsuccessfully) to reduce the phenome-
nal difference to other, presumably more basic distinctions, in the hope
that this will reveal the tautologous essence of the contradiction. Ramsey,
understandably, puts pressure on Wittgenstein’s maneuver. Here is how
he expresses the worry:
He [Wittgensetein] tries to show how this may be, by analysing
them in terms of vibrations. But even supposing that the physicist
thus provides an analysis of what we mean by “red” Mr. Wittgen-
stein is only reducing the difficulty to that of the necessary prop-
erties of space, time, and matter, or the ether. He explicitly makes
it depend on the impossibility of a particle being in two places at
the same time. These necessary properties of space and time are
hardly capable of a further reduction of this kind. For example,
considering between in point of time as regards my experiences; if
B is between A and D and C between B and D, then C must be
between A and D; but it is hard to see how this can be a formal
tautology (Ibid. 473).
To anticipate our diagnosis, contingent contradictions of the above
kind should be thought of as two-footed creatures with regard to their
ontological ground. It should be clear that in these circumstances, the
opposition between the two conflicting states of affairs does not consist
in the impossibility of their co-existence as absolute parts of the same re-
ality, but in that they jointly make it simultaneously true and false that
something is the case. 
C) Existential, material and alethic opposition
To prepare the ground for our analysis, let us make the following distinc-
tions. When two (possible) facts f1 and  f2 are such as to make a proposi-
tion p and (respectively) its negation ~p true, we shall say that  f1 and f2
are in alethic opposition. This may happen for two reasons. 
In the first scenario, the existence of either fact excludes the existence
of the other. In this case we shall say that  f1 and  f2 are in existential op-
position. Clearly, if the possible truth-makers of, respectively, p and ~p
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are in existential opposition, they are also in alethic opposition, since
whenever one of them exists to make p or ~p true, the other fails to exist
(thus failing to make it true), and therefore p and ~p cannot be simulta-
neously true. If our analysis is right, however, the dialetheist must think
that the converse implication may fail: sometimes (when a contradiction
is true) the grounding facts must be in alethic opposition without being
in existential opposition. 
In the second scenario – the only one compatible with dialetheism, we
argue – f1 and  f2 are in alethic opposition, i.e. they make p and ~p re-
spectively true, but they are not in existential opposition, i.e. they are ca-
pable of co-existing. In this case we shall say that the two facts are mate-
rially opposed but not existentially opposed. 
There are two ways in which such material opposition can be opera-
tive in making a negative sentence true. The opposition can occur (1)
among positive facts, like when an object is said to be not square because
it is round; or (2) among a positive and a negative fact, like when the
truth that there are no Arctic penguins is supposed to be made true by
the negative fact that there are no Arctic penguins. We shall consider
these scenarios in turn, starting from the first (sec. 7-8).
5. The opposition between facts 
A) Preparing the ground: primitive oppositions
An early attempt to obviate to the difficulty of accounting for negative
truths by resorting to a primitive relation of “opposition” between propo-
sitions can be found in Demos 1917. This relation is primitive in that it
is indefinable, but its crucial characteristic is that no two such opposite
propositions may be simultaneously true:
The relation of opposition is such that, if p opposes q, p and q are
not both true (at least one of them is false). This must not to be
taken as a definition, for it makes use of the notion “not” which,
I said, is equivalent to the notion “opposite”. In fact, opposition
seems epistemologically to be a primitive notion (Demos, 1917:
191, our emphasis).
Notice that this view, if correct, would exclude the existence of di-
aletheias by default. It is therefore interesting for our purposes to see why
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it fails. Indeed, the possibility to account for negative truthmaking in
terms of this sort of alethic opposition alone is the first option that Rus-
sell 1919 considers and quickly dismisses on the way to his reluctant ac-
ceptance of negative facts. In objecting to Demos’ proposal, Russell ad-
vances a circularity objection similar to that raised against the simple “ab-
sence” view of false-making: 
Usually it is said that, when we deny something, we are really as-
serting something else which is incompatible with what we deny.
If we say “roses are not blue,” we mean “roses are white or red or
yellow.” But such a view will not bear a moment’s scrutiny. It is on-
ly plausible when the positive quality by which our denial is supposed
to be replaced is incapable of existing together with the quality denied
(Russell, 1919: 4, our emphasis)
Clearly, Russell’s last caveat is meant to ensure at the same time that
(1) the relevant facts are indeed alethically opposed to each other, e.g.
that the fact that roses are red entail that it is false that they are blue; and
(2) that these facts all cohere with each other (PNC). If there is any log-
ical space for true (contingent) contradictions, we argue, there must be a
fact which makes wannabe contradictory states of affairs alethically op-
posed, without making them “incapable of existing together”. It is plain
that this possibility entirely depends on the details of one’s theory of
false-making and on one’s account of what makes opposing facts “incom-
patible”. Russell justifies his dismissal of this kind of opposition as a can-
didate for an ultimate explanation of negative truths thus: 
The only reason we can deny “the table is square” by “the table is
round” is that what is round is not square. And this has to be a
fact, though just as negative as the fact that this table is not square.
Thus it is plain that incompatibility cannot exist without negative
facts (Ibid.)
In short, one can account for the truth of ~p by making reference to
the truth of p only if p and q are incompatible, that is only if the propo-
sition ‘p and q are not compatible’ is true. But this is just as negative a
fact as that which makes ~p true (see also Grossmann 1992 and Molnar
2000: 78 for analogous arguments). Here we are not interested in Rus-
sell’s conclusion that negative truths must be made true by negative facts.
Be that as it may, the admission that blue and red are not logically op-
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posed – so much so that their opposition would require a mysterious
negative fact to be made true – entails that their hypothetical coexistence
is also not a logical truth-functional contradiction. And this, we argue,
creates the logical space for a form of dialetheism that appears to evade
standard transcendental arguments against it. 
The admission that blue and red are not logically opposed, and that
no amount of analysis could make them so, in fact, entails that their co-
existence is also not a truth-functional contradiction. This means that the
mere fact that blue and red are alethically opposed – that if it is true that
something is red then it is false that it is blue, and vice versa – is not suf-
ficient to prove that the two opposing truth-makers cannot co-exist, thus
producing a contradiction. To be sure, nothing we said makes it at all
plausible that they can so co-exist. As a matter of fact, no one has ever
suggested that these phenomenal facts are actually compatible in the rel-
evant sense. All that follows from these observations is that such plausible
existential exclusions between facts is not something that can be achieved
without argument, for free. 
To illustrate our thesis, we now turn our attention to two concrete
proposals: Priest’s Hegelian account of motion (sec. B) and Fine’s Frag-
mentalism (sec. C).
B) The opposition between spatial locations: Priest’s Hegelian account of
motion
Zeno’s arguments appear to show that time and change are contradictory.
At the beginning of last Century, Russell believed to have finally found a
solution to these ancient antinomies. It consisted of an application of ba-
sic notions of calculus, as these had been recently rigorized by Cantor,
Weierstrass and others. Some have argued that the main attempt to re-
move these contradictions without denying time and change altogether,
the now widely accepted Russellian account, proves to be at best a re-
statement of the problem (see for example Arntzenius 2000; Tooley
1988; Bigelow and Pargetter 1990; Carroll 2002 and Boccardi 2018).
We are thus faced with a dilemma. Either accept the phenomenological
datum that things change and time passes, at the cost of accepting that
at least some contradictions are true; or hold fast to the PNC, and repu-
diate time and change as mere appearances. Priest (1987) has shown that
the first option is not as abhorrent as one may think and that it ought to
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be seriously explored. This will be our first concrete example of an oppo-
sition ontology for dialetheism.
If an object is determinately at one location, then it is not determi-
nately at another disjoint location (and vice versa). Drawing from famil-
iar and venerable considerations dating back to Zeno of Elea, and in-
spired by Hegel’s thoughts about change, Priest put forward an account
of motion (and of the passage of time) which postulates that objects in
motion are inconsistently, simultaneously located at different places. A
brief discussion of Priest’s Hegelian account of motion should help clar-
ify how alethic (but not existential) opposition is supposed to give rise to
true contradictions.
Unlike Russell, Hegel did hold a state of motion to be intrinsic: there
is an instantaneous difference between a moving body and a stationary
one. As Hegel himself puts it in The Science of Logic: “motion is itself con-
tradiction’s immediate existence. Something moves, not because now it
is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now
it is here and not here” (Hegel, 2010: 382; cf. Priest, 1987). Hegel is not
denying that if something is in motion it will be in different places at dif-
ferent times. Rather, the point is that this is not sufficient for it to be in
motion. What is required for it to be in motion at a certain time, accord-
ing to this view, is for it both to occupy and not to occupy a certain place
at that time:
So let us inquire why, exactly, Hegel held this view of motion. The
reason is roughly as follows. Consider a body in motion – say, a
point particle. At a certain instant of time, t, it occupies a certain
point of space, x, and, since it is there, it is not anywhere else. But
now consider a time very, very close to t, t’. Let us suppose that
over such small intervals of time as that between t and t’ it is im-
possible to localise a body. Thus, the body is equally at the place it
occupies at t’, x’ (≠x). Hence, at this instant the body is both at x
and at x’ and, equally, not at either. This is essentially why Hegel
thought that motion realizes a contradiction (Priest, 1987: 176,
our emphasis).
A few considerations are in order. First, notice that the sort of di-
aletheia that motion would realize if the theory was correct is of the two-
footed kind that we have been discussing. The body is “equally” (though
inconsistently) at all the locations it occupies at any given time. It is es-
sential, for this to be the case, that all the facts which correspond to the
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various locations occupied at a time determinately co-exist at that time.
In our terminology, these facts are materially (and hence alethically) op-
posed, but not existentially opposed. If they were existentially opposed –
say because the existence of the fact that the body is in position x at t en-
tails that the fact that it is in x’ at t does not exist – the proposition that
the object is in x would not be (also) false. As Zeno thought, the object
could not move. 
Second, as the expression “since it is there, it is not anywhere else”
makes clear, the body being located in x at time t is simultaneously the
truthmaker for the proposition that it is located in x and the false-maker
for the proposition that it is located elsewhere (say, in x’). This is precisely
the sort of material opposition between positive facts that we are suggest-
ing constitutes the grounds for all (possible) contingent dialetheias.7 As
we shall see in a later section, this view is passible of two interpretation,
depending on whether the relevant material oppositions are supposed to
obtain between positive facts (as we have assumed here), or between pos-
itive and negative facts.
We shall now turn to another example of a view according to which
the world determinately contains incoherent truth-makers: Kit Fine’s
Fragmentalism. 
C) One step away from dialetheism: Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism
Another (related) domain of facts which has been argued to engender
contradiction is the domain of tensed facts. Tensed facts – also known as
A-facts – are the truth-makers of propositions that make (implicit or ex-
plicit) reference to when events are located relative to the present. What-
ever fact makes it true that Napoleon’s death occurred in the past, for ex-
ample, is a tensed fact, since it mentions the tensed property (A-proper-
ty) being past. That this death occurred before your birth, instead, is not
a tensed fact. If it is true that time passes, it seems natural to suppose that
this is because temporarily present facts become objectively past, that is,
because A-determinations keep shifting. McTaggart (1908) famously
claimed that it is impossible that events instantiate shifting A-properties.
This would require them to inconsistently instantiate each of the incom-
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7 In Boccardi 2019 one of the authors of this paper has argued that Priest’s account is
insufficient to overcome the objections levelled against the rival Russellian account. 
patible determinations of pastness, presentness and futurity (the A-deter-
minations). It is of no use to insist that these determinations are never
had simultaneously, he thinks. To point out that, for example, the pre-
sentness of your existence succeeds that of the French revolution does
nothing but re-propose at a second order level the same predicament that
afflicted us in the first place: it is tantamount to saying that the present-
ness of your existence was future when that of the French revolution was
present etc., and so on ad infinitum.
Kit Fine (2005) has advanced a similar argument to the effect that the
reality of temporal passage entails the obtainment of incoherent states of
affairs. Your breakfast yesterday, for example, has been present. Since it
has been true for you to say: “I’m having breakfast”, there must have been
a fact making this proposition true. This fact is incompatible with the
(different) fact making now true that yesterday’s breakfast is past. But
yesterday’s breakfast is past! For reasons that need not detain us here, Fine
believes that the ontology that is most hospitable to the view that time
passes (called Fragmentalism) is one according to which all these conflict-
ing facts obtain, or coexist (2005: 281):
Reality may be irredeemably incoherent. […] Under such a view,
reality will be fragmentary. Certain of the facts constituting reality
will ‘cohere’ and some will not. Any fact is plausibly taken to be-
long to a ‘fragment’ or maximally coherent collection of facts; and
so reality will divide up into a number of different but possibly
overlapping fragments.
He proposes that we take this relation of coherence between facts as a
primitive notion (Ibid.). It is by this coherence relation that the maximal
‘fragments’ are individuated. Now, this is a perfect example of a contra-
diction that would emerge out of the material incompatibility of (posi-
tive) facts. A fundamental pillar of this ontology is the determined (co-
)existence of all the opposing facts: “The constitution of reality is an ab-
solute matter” (Fine, 2005: 271). Incoherence emerges out of an over-de-
termination of reality, not out of an indetermination. Once again, the
logical space of dialetheism is found inside the cracks of the tractarian ac-
count of tautologies and contradictions. 
To be precise, Fine does not think that the co-existence of incoherent
facts gives rise to dialetheias (and for this reason his ontology does not re-
quire the adoption of a paraconsistent logic). What blocks the derivation
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of true contradictions of the form p&~p, as noted by Lipman 2015, is
that the coexistence of incoherent facts, i.e. the fact that they belong to
different fragments, does not entail that they obtain together, or that they
“co-obtain”: formally, if we indicate the relation of co-obtainment by the
symbol ‘∘’ this amounts to the fact that co-obtainment does not satisfy
adjunction: p,~p⊭p∘~p. 
Thus, there might be a fact making true that you are sitting and also
one making true that you are not sitting; but it doesn’t follow from this
that you are ever both sitting and not sitting. Of course, this puts some
pressure on fragmentalism: in what sense are two incompatible facts in-
compatible?8 What is important for us, however, is that Fine’s fragments
are in alethic opposition according to our definition, since there are in re-
ality both truth-makers and a false-makers for the same propositions. To
make Fragmentalism into a full-blown dialetheist picture, one just needs
to postulate a relation of co-obtainment that allows adjunction and adopt
a paraconsistent logic to block explosion. This is a paradigmatic case of
the kind of opposition view we are suggesting dialetheists should favour. 
If we are right that the prospect for making dialetheism true (in the
robust, truth-maker sense) live and die with the prospect of a material
opposition view of negative truths, then the scope of dialetheism, i.e.
which kinds of truths are apt to engender dialetheias, is equally bound to
the scope of material opposition. The account we are considering pro-
poses to make (logical) room for dialetheias by postulating relations of
material opposition between positive facts9. 
D) Negative facts 
Let us take stock. We have said (section 5) that the tractarian, sheer ab-
sence views of negative truths are inhospitable to dialetheism. In a tractar-
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8 As Lipman (2015: 3125) puts it: “The fragmentalist must offer some understanding
of incompatible facts that allows us to see how two incompatible facts can both be-
long to reality. The most promising proposal is that facts are incompatible if and on-
ly if it is metaphysically impossible that they cohere”. 
9 It should be noted that, as many have observed (e.g. Molnar, 2000), the opposition
between positive facts is confined to the opposition between determinate properties
(e.g. between being red vs being blue), and does not occur between determinable
properties (e.g. between being a scented liquid vs being an odourless liquid). If this
is so, the view under consideration here would restrict the possibility of dialetheias
to the case of determinate properties only.
ian world, a true contradiction would be impossible for it would require
the simultaneous presence and absence of the facts which make it true. We
argued that an account of negative truths based on the notion of opposi-
tion between simultaneously existing facts is more promising for dialethe-
ism. In the last two sections we discussed a version of this idea based on
the material opposition between positive facts. We discussed some of its
shortcomings and potential limits: it probably still requires a (further)
negative fact to make the oppositions themselves true (Russell, 1919;
Grossmann, 1992); and it appears to be limited to the case in which the
negated properties are determinates of determinables (Molnar, 2000).
The variant of the opposition account that we shall consider here ex-
ploits the Russellian idea that reality comprises sui generis negative facts.
We have already discussed some of the reasons which might force us to
postulate these admittedly mysterious entities. To be clear, ‘negative facts’
are called ‘negative’ only because they make negative truths true. Howev-
er, qua entities, they are just as positive as apples are. But what sort of
things can they be? How do they differ from positive facts? Commenting
on the natural repugnance one has about negative facts, Priest says: 
What is this repugnance? One source of it is, I suspect, the obvi-
ous truth that everything that exists is. Add to this the thought
that negative facts are not, and it follows that no such facts exist.
This is a confusion, however as old as Parmenides: negative facts
are not, in the sense that they ground truths of the form ‘it is not
the case that so and so’, but they are in exactly the same way that
all existent things are, viz. they are part of reality (2006: 53).
Another similar objection to negative facts stems from considering
their putative internal structure. Although positive facts are themselves
theoretical constructs mysterious enough to a minimalist mind, they are
yet familiar enough as to contain entities, properties and relations as their
constituents. “But the things, properties, and relations which are the sup-
posed constituents of negative states of affairs, do not exist. Should we
therefore say that negative states of affairs are complexes of non-existent
elements? It seems that only Meinong had the courage to bite this bullet”
(Molnar, 2000: 77, see also Findlay, 1963, pp. 50-58)10. This objection,
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we think, must be qualified. Granted that negative facts are rather mys-
terious entities, why assume that the things, properties, and relations
which are the supposed constituents of them do not exist or that they are
not part of negative facts? Sure, this may be the case, but it need not be.
It is the case, for example, of the truth that the golden mountain does not
exist. But it does not appear to be the case of more mundane negatives,
such as the claim that the train has not arrived yet. As the view presented
in the next section illustrates, it is the latter kind of negative truths that
are the best candidates to be involved in dialetheias. 
E) Priest’s polarity view of facts
To better appreciate how a theory of negative facts might work in more
details, we shall consider a view developed by Priest 2000 and Beall 2000:
the Polarity Theory. A standard model of a (positive) fact is the ordered
tuple <Rn,o1,...,on>, where Rn is a (n-ary) relation and o1,...,on are objects.
This standard view is clearly unsuitable to model negative facts in any
straightforward fashion. The Polarity view, instead, proposes to model
positive facts as tuples of the form  and negative ones as tuples of the form<Rn,o1,…,on,+>. The burden of distinguishing the obtaining from the
non-obtaining of the fact is (formally) left on the undefined polarities ‘+’
and ‘-’11. 
Many have objected that this set-theoretic model of negative facts
does nothing to answer the metaphysical question of what kind of enti-
ties negative facts are. Are the polarities ‘+’ and ‘-’ mere models, or are
they supposed to correspond to something in reality (Dodd, 2007: 390)?
Priest and Beall are well aware that their account is explanatorily unsat-
isfactory. However, they note that many respectable theoretical con-
structs share the same mysteriousness:
It is certainly the case that this polarity is built into reality. But
there are lots of polarities built into physical reality (like, for ex-
ample, being a left hand or a right hand, or the spin of an atomic
particle). I do not see why metaphysical polarities should be any
worse than these (Priest, 2000: p. 318; see also Beall, 2000: p. 26).
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This response is likely to make many metaphysicians raise their eye-
brows. After all, we have an empirical concept of a left hand, and we
know that spin is a physical property. What kind of thing is a polarity?
“What is lacking”, contends Dodd, for example, “is an account of the na-
ture of these polarities, and it is this […] that provides a decisive disanal-
ogy between Priest and Beall’s polarities and the polarities to be found in
physical reality” (Dodd, 2007: 290).
We think that this objection has some teeth, but that some considera-
tions are in order. True, Priest and Beall don’t tell us what kind of thing po-
larities are. But, for that matter, typical accounts of truth-makers in terms
of facts don’t tell us what kind of things facts are, other than that they are
perhaps abstract entities, and that they “glue” relations and objects togeth-
er into a single unity. Isn’t this mysterious too? One plausible rationale for
postulating (positive) facts is that the mere existence of the objects and of
the relations does not suffice, alone, to make it true that these objects truly
stand in that relation. As we have already noted, however, the mere exis-
tence of the components does neither suffice to make it true that they do
not stand in the relation: that the objects and the relations are separated,
rather than united. Why shouldn’t we take the negative polarity to signify
such primitive notion of separation? A spatial metaphor may perhaps be
of help in clarifying this consideration. That two objects are adjacent to
each other is a (contingent) fact that needs to be made true by a truth-
maker (the position of the objects, or their distance, say). But surely, also
the truth that the objects are not adjacent, that is, that they are separated
is equally in need of being made true by a similar truth-maker (again, plau-
sibly, the position or distance between the objects).
F) Rewriting the Tractatus
A potentially more serious objection against Priest and Beall’s polarity
view is that it is compatible is compatible with the idea that negative
truths are made true by the sheer lack of a truth-maker.
[T]he important question is whether the polarity theorist can of-
fer a suitable account of the nature of polarities that succeeds in
representing them as anything more than absences. To do that
they must reveal what more they are. But here polarity theory runs
out of explanatory resources. The problem is that all attempts to
define polarities so as to avoid the above criticism are doomed to
circularity (Stevens, 2008: 299).
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If this criticism were sound, this would be disaster for the prospects of
applying the polarity view to dialetheism (for example, to Priest’s
Hegelian account of motion). However, we think that more needs to be
done to show that the polarity account relapses to the mere absence view
of negatives. It is true in a sense that, as Stevens observes, “the polarities
of facts signal nothing more than the instantiation or non-instantiation
of properties and/or relations” (Ibid.: 299). But this statement has to be
qualified. In fact, one could raise the same objection against good old
positive facts. What does a standard tuple <Rn,o1,…,on> signal, any more
than that the objects o1,…,on stand in the relation Rn? We could not agree
more with Stevens when he claims that “[u]nless ∼A is understood as
having a truthmaker distinct from the mere absence of A’s truthmaker,
there is surely no conceivable way in which reality can produce a truth-
maker for A ∧ ∼A.” (Ibid.: 294); but we disagree that Priest’s and Beall’s
account is implicitly committed to this a view, or incapable of excluding
it. Interestingly, Priest observes that one could rethink the tractarian
world to make room for negative facts: “[i]ndeed, as far as I can see, one
could simply rewrite Tractatus substituting the above theory of facts for
the one given there. The result would be almost exactly the same, except
that the logic of the world would be first-degree entailment and not clas-
sical logic.” (Priest, 2000: 316). One could squeeze negative facts into a
tractarian world, thereby obtaining a dialetheist version of it.
Here we shall not pursue this matter further, other than by noting that
Priest’s and Beall’s insistence that realism about negative facts is an opti-
mal ontological environment for Dialetheism is in line with our overall
analysis: Dialetheism can afford truthmakers only by endorsing an oppo-
sition theory of false-making. After considering and dismissing a number
of proposals Molnar concludes on a pessimistic note:
The Holy Grail of positive truthmakers for negative truths re-
mains undiscovered. We need positive truthmakers for negative
truths but we have no good theory of what these might be. That
is the sad conclusion from the arguments of this paper. I have crit-
icised proposals by other philosophers for solving the problem of
negative truths, but that criticism must be tempered by the ac-
knowledgment that where they have failed, so have I. It is an im-
passe and at present I cannot see the way out (Molnar, 2000).
If Molnar is right about the prospect of the opposition theories, then
equally undiscovered are the possible truth-makers of dialetheias. There
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remains the option of abandoning the idea of truth-makers altogether.
Dodd, for example, arguing that the problems that we mentioned are in-
tractable, concludes that: “[s]ince there cannot be a truthmaker theory
that solves the problem of negative truths whilst remaining well motivat-
ed, we should give up on truthmaking altogether.” (Dodd, 2007: 400)
Surely, a view that denies that even contingent truths need truth-makers
is more hospitable to dialetheism than its rivals. Notice, in fact, that of
all three notions of opposition that we have discussed – alethic, material,
and existential –, only the first makes any sense in a world without truth-
makers. And since, as we have seen, there are contradictions that are not
tautologous, only a classical preconception about how truth values and
negation work could block the conclusion that some contradictions may
be true. Now, we find this draconian move unpalatable to the extreme,
especially in the case of contingent truths. But we won’t argue for this
thesis here, leaving it to the reader to pick up his or her favourite theory
of negative truths.
6. Single fact contradictions
A) Logical and semantic paradoxes
If we are right, dialetheias could only be made true by the existence of two
facts (either both positive or of different polarities). At this juncture one
may reasonably ask why a single determinately existing fact could not
make simultaneously true a proposition and its negation, thus engender-
ing a single-footed dialetheia. A friend of the tractarian understanding of
propositions would surely bulk at this hypothesis. Propositions, according
to this theory, only have one slot to which a truth-value can be assigned,
so to speak. Once a proposition is made true (by a fact) there is simply no
more room for another assignment: the falsity (indeed, untruth) of its
negation is assigned by default, with “no further ado”. Now, this defence
would simply begs the question if it were thought of as a defence of an
elenchtic “proof” of the universal validity of PNC. To claim that proposi-
tions can get at most one truth-value, in fact, is tantamount to claiming
that dialetheias cannot be true, that is to a logical formulation of the PNC. 
It is interesting to notice, however, that in cases where a proposition
logically entails its negation (p⊃~p), we have a guarantee that any truth-
maker for p would thereby (by default) be a truthmaker for ~p as well,
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with no further ado. This is clearly the case (perhaps only the case?) of
the logical paradoxes. These include the semantic paradoxes of truth, de-
notation, predication (the liar, Grelling’s, Berry’s, Richard’s, Köenig’s,
etc); and the set-theoretic ones of membership, cardinality, etc (Russell’s,
Cantor’s, Burali-Forti’s, Mirimanoff ’s, etc.).
The dialetheist strategy, in these cases, is to take the formulation of
these arguments as bona fide sound arguments (cf. Priest, 1987). These
cases appear to contradict our thesis that dialetheias are necessarily two-
footed. Although a detailed treatment of these cases will have to wait for
another paper, let us make a couple of considerations. 
First, as many have argued, it is not clear that these paradoxes can be
taken as bona fide arguments, since the contradictory propositions in
question may be plausibly argued to simply lack an ontological ground
(truth-makers). This is, for example, Kripke’s influential response (see
Kripke, 1975: 57). However, it appears as a weak response to the di-
aletheist proposal, since arguably the sole ground for supposing that
these propositions lack truth-makers is that if they did they could pro-
duce true contradictions. As Kirkham put it: “Kripke’s solution is no
more and no less ad hoc than is […] Tarski’s. He has no independent
reasons, other than to solve the paradox, for placing the restrictions he
does on what can and cannot have a truthvalue.” (Kirkham, 1992:
291). 
A second response would be to claim that the truth-maker principle
should be limited to contingent truths. Necessary truths, such as the
truths of mathematics and logic, according to this less than maximalist
truth-maker principle, do not stand in need of truth-makers. The ratio-
nale for this restriction of the principle is that necessary truths are true
not in virtue of how the world is, but however the world may be: they
don’t need any contribution from the actual world.
Now, one must be careful, in a post-tractarian era, to qualify this state-
ment. If necessary truths don’t need a contribution from the world, this
is not in virtue of them being modal claims per se. As we have seen, pace
Wittgenstein, there may well be necessary truths that do need such a con-
tribution. What makes these tautological truths vacuously true, or “true
by default”, is rather that in these cases truth and falsity might be argued
to exhaust the whole logical space, not leaving any room for a distinction
between untrue and false. This would clearly block the dialetheist ma-
neuver. But it would also clearly beg the question against it. The sole rea-
son one has to argue that the logical space in these cases is exhausted by
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the exclusion of truth and falsity, in fact, is the requirement that these be-
have classically. 
A better response, we think, is to claim that what makes a self-refer-
ential non-empirical proposition true (if it is true), is whatever proof we
have for its truth. As Stevens suggests, for example: “the proof of the Liar
sentence in a semantically closed language L is its truth-maker, and that
the proof of the falsity of the sentence in L is the fact which shows the
Liar to be false” (Stevens, 2007: 294). Now, it is true that, as Stevens im-
mediately notices, if this was the appropriate response in these cases it
would contradict the postulation of sui generis negative facts (e.g. the Po-
lar View). However, nothing forces the dialetheist to endorse a single uni-
fied account of all truth-making. It is rather plausible, we think, to as-
sume that, if non-empirical truths need truth-makers at all, these would
not be the same kind of entities as those needed to make empirical
propositions true. For our concerns what matters is that under this ac-
count the truth-makers of dialetheias would be two-footed, rather than
based on the simultaneous presence and absence of a single truth-maker.
So much for the possibility of one-footed, non-empirical dialetheias.
What about empirical ones?
B) Contradictory objects
Why shouldn’t the dialetheist think that a single empirical fact could
make a proposition simultaneously true and false? This would be the
case, for example, if an individual entity could instantiate an inconsistent
property. Now, in most cases where this has been suggested to be possi-
ble, the inconsistent property in question is not a simple property, but
the logical product of two (or more) simple properties. Take for example
the property of being a squared circle. Clearly this is a property obtained
by conjoining the properties of being squared and circular. Thus, if an
entity were capable of instantiating such a property, it could only do so
by participating to two opposing facts. The dialetheia in question, that is,
would be two-footed, in spite of the apparent superficial form of the
proposition. We think that all plausible cases of empirical dialetheias will
be seen to comply with this analysis, if properly construed. 
A possible exception to our view is the case of gluons. Gluons are in-
consistent objects postulated by Priest (2014) to solve the ancient para-
dox of the One and the Many: how can a whole be one if it consists of
nothing but a plurality of parts? Merely invoking their unity doesn’t solve
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the problem, since it is merely a further element equally in need of being
unified. Once again, in the face of a paradox, Priest’s strategy is to bite
the bullet and accept that reality is contradictory. Gluons are identical to
all their parts, by definition. But they are also not identical to their parts,
since they have properties that none of their parts have (like being iden-
tical to the other parts). They are therefore identical and not identical to
their parts. Isn’t this an exception to our view?
Our response to this challenge is analogous to the one we gave in the
case of semantic and logical paradoxes. In non-empirical cases such as
this, where the entities involved are theoretical constructs and abstract
definitions, it is plausible to suppose that the truth-makers of true propo-
sitions (if there are any) are their proofs themselves. In discussing the case
of semantic and logical paradoxes we noted that this view fits well with
our contention that dialetheias are necessarily two-footed. Just like it
happens in the case of Kantian antinomies, in those cases the reasons for
believing a proposition (its proof ) were never identical to the reasons for
believing its negation. We think that the case of gluons is analogous in
this respect. The reason for stating that a gluon is identical to its part is
the definition of gluon, while the reason for supposing that it is not iden-
tical to them is a more or less complicated chain of deductions. Never
does the same proof support both p and ~p. At any rate, nowhere in
Priest’s treatment does it appear that what makes it true or false that glu-
ons are different from their parts is the absence of a truth-maker for it. 
Let us now conclude our survey with a few considerations about the
nature of the opposition relation. This relation, we have argued, is the
Holy Grail of dialetheism.
7. Opposition and exclusion
A) The intuition of exclusion
It is interesting to ask what – short of a formal tautology – could make it
true that two states of affairs are alethically opposed to each other. Surely
it must be a fact, albeit perhaps a brute fact. Before we try to answer this
question, however, let us test the tenability and the scope of this account
of negative truths. What could the relation of material opposition consist
of, if it is to guarantee alethic opposition without excluding coexistence?
Surely, there is a sense in which two materially opposed facts are compat-
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ible, since they can coexist. Yet, in another sense, they must also be in-
compatible, since they are alethically opposed.
Let us answer this question by first digging dipper into the role that
the relation of opposition is supposed to play. Pondering on how we
should conceptualise the negation operator, Sainsbury claimed that our
grasp of incompatibility is more basic than our grasp of truth and falsity: 
Understanding negation involves a sensitivity to incompatibility,
but this notion does not have to be specified [by direct reference
to truth and falsity]. For instance, one might suggest that the basic
notion of incompatibility in directly semantic terms consists in
the fact that incompatible sentences must have opposite truth val-
ues, which makes true contradictions conjunctions of incompati-
bles. However, one might prefer to avoid an account of under-
standing which involved attributing such semantic notions to
speakers, for example on the grounds that the account would not
be neutral with respect to realist and intuitionist preconceptions
(Sainsbury, 1997: 224)
Indeed, as Francesco Berto (2007: 304) rightly observes commenting
on this passage, an account of incompatibility that made direct reference
to what we called alethic opposition, i.e. an account according to which
two facts are incompatible if and only if they make a proposition respec-
tively true and false, might not be neutral with respect to dialetheist pre-
conceptions too, which is our concern here. Sainsbury continues to argue
that our experience of incompatibility is more primitive than our use of
negation, and that the use of the negation operator may plausibly be “ex-
plained initially as a means of registering (privately or publicly) a per-
ceived incompatibility” (Ibid.: 226-8). 
Could we use this primitive notion of incompatibility to characterize
our notion of material opposition? Not without substantial disambigua-
tion, we think. As we have already mentioned, the notion of incompati-
bility becomes ambiguous in the context of assessing the virtues of di-
aletheism. One must clearly distinguish the incompatibility which en-
sues from existential opposition from that which ensues from mere ma-
terial opposition12. To which notion should we take Sainsbury’s primitive
incompatibility to correspond? 
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12 This ambiguity is analogous to one we mentioned when talking about Kit Fine’s
Prima facie, given the reference to “perceived incompatibility” we may
take it to correspond to our notion of existential opposition. As we said,
in cases where two facts are existentially opposed, dialetheias are excluded
by default, since the candidate dialetheia necessarily lacks one of its re-
quired feet. Indeed, building on Sainsbury’s considerations, Berto sug-
gested that dialetheists should construct a notion of negation (NOT)
which captures the classical notion of excluding incompatibility. It is
worth delving into some details of this proposal, since it shall be useful
for expressing our view in a concise manner. 
Many have noted that, since dialetheists refuse to ascribe to the nega-
tion operator its standard excluding role, they would have a hard time ex-
pressing in what sense they disagree with their opponents. After all, how
is a dialetheist to disagree with Aristotle, for example, if not by claiming
that the PNC is not universally valid? And how is she to exclude that by
making this claim she is not (also) agreeing with Aristotle? Priest’s re-
sponse to this objection on behalf of dialetheism is two-fold. 
On the one hand, since the PNC, in its formal guise ~(p&~p) is an
axiom also in most paraconsistent logics (including LP), it is argued that
the dialetheist is not committed to the claim that the principle is false but
only to the claim that it is also false (Priest 1987: 284). This manoeuvre,
however, is unlikely to satisfy the critic. Shouldn’t the dialetheist at least
be capable to disagree with something? As Berto put it: “Wouldn’t it be
nice to find at least a formulation [of the PNC] which the dialetheist is
forced not to accept?” (Ibid., p. 301). 
Here enters Priest’s second combatting manoeuvre. This is to claim
that the “not” of natural language is ambiguous between a content mod-
ifier (which behaves paraconsistently) and the act of denial, i.e. a
force/speech act indicator. The advantage of this strategy is that speech act
indicators cannot be embedded into the contents of propositions: “a force
operator does not interact with the content of what is uttered” (2006:
208; see also Berto, 2008). In short, the idea is that the dialetheist can re-
ject the universal validity of the PNC, but this rejection cannot be unam-
biguously captured by the standard negation operator. It is crucial for the
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Fragmentalism. There, the issue was to distinguish the compatibility between facts
belonging to a same fragment (“co-obtainment”) with the compatibility between
different fragments (co-existence). Here, instead, we are in the business of distin-
guishing material incompatibility from existential incompatibility. 
success of Priest’s manoeuvre that acceptance and rejection be not com-
patible. And this time it better be the case that this incompatibility be ex-
clusive, i.e. that it be made true by the facts of acceptance and rejection
being existentially opposed. These pragmatic acts are supposed to bear the
whole burden of exclusivity. But how could Priest even express this? 
B) The excluding negation: NOT
Berto proposes an interesting way to get away from this impasse, which
we think can be useful to clarify the distinction between existential and
material opposition. Drawing from a suggestion originally made by
Dunn (1996), Berto recommends that the dialetheist avail herself of an
exclusive negation (denoted by NOT), which substantially behaves like
a classical negation. Dunn’s idea is that “one can define a negation in
terms of one primitive relation of incompatibility […] in a metaphysical
framework (1996: 9). This idea stems from the notion of ortho-negation
introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) and Goldblatt (1974)
in the context of quantum logic. Berto’s proposal is to exploit ortho-
negation (indicated by the symbol ┴) to build an exclusive negation as
follows. Given the ordered pair <S,┴>, where S is a set of properties, the
exclusive negation operator is: NOT P1 x =def ∃P2 (P2 x &P1 ┴ P2).
Our suggestion is to take the operator NOT as signaling, at the semat-
ic level, the contrast between True and Untrue (lack of truth); and at the
ontological level the contrast between the existence and non-existence of
a truth-maker. In other words, if it is the case that NOT P1 a, that is, if NOT
P1 x =def∃P2 (P2 x &P1 ┴ P2), then NOT P2 a is true and NOT P1 a untrue (not
merely false). In this case, the facts that would make P1 a or P2 a true are
in existential opposition. However, if we only know that ~P1 a, then we
do not have enough information to deduce that it is also the case that
NOT P1 a, that is, that there doesn’t exist a truth-maker for P1 a.To express
the thought that two facts P1 a and P2 a are in material but not existential
opposition, the dialetheist will have to supply the further information
that they are NOT (mind the capital letters!) in existential opposition:
NOT (P1 ┴ P2).
It is not clear whether in order to accept this strong form of negation
the dialetheist needs to give up the pragmatic/psychological understand-
ing of exclusion (see Berto 2007: 311). On the one hand, one could ar-
gue that unlike a force indicator the ‘NOT’ operator does interact with
the content of the proposition negated: it must interact in a way that is
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different from that of ‘~’. On the other hand, this concession threatens
to open the way to reformulations of the paradoxes of self-reference
against which the dialetheist’s weapons would be blunted (see Carrara,
Martino 2017). We wish to remain neutral about this issue. For our part,
we have introduced the exclusive negation to capture the two sides of the
debate in a concise manner, not to suggest that the dialetheist should
commit to two possible ways of being false. The dialetheist might want
to avoid this conclusion. This depends on whether she concedes that
sometimes (when the excluding negation is involved) negative truths are
made true by the sheer absence of a false-maker or not. We have seen that
there are reasons to resist this concession. One may think of three reasons
why two propositions are alethically opposed: (1) because their possible
truth-makers are materially opposed, (2) because they are existentially
opposed, or (3) because one of the propositions (the negative one) does
not need a truth-maker to be true. What we are saying here is that ac-
cepting to use the excluding negation does not per se force the dialetheist
to choose between existential exclusion (options 2) and the tractarian al-
ternative (option 3) as its proper ontological underpinning. Bearing this
in mind, let us apply these notions. 
C) Using exclusion to formulate the PNC
Using the operator NOT, Berto (Ibid.: 315) moves on to express the
PNC in terms of it:
[Exclusive-PNC] For any object, it is impossible that the same charac-
teristic belong and NOT belong to it at the same time.
The view that we have argued is most inhospitable to dialetheism, i.e.
that all negative truths are made true by the sheer absence of a truth-mak-
er, could be characterised as:
[The tractarian view of negation]Necessarily, for all proposition p, not
p if and only if NOT p.
We have argued that tractarian views make dialetheias impossible.
The reason is that they make it impossible that false-makers co-obtain
with truth-makers: they impose falseness to be equivalent to absence of
truth. The tractarian theorist will then take the exclusion version of the
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PNC as equivalent to the standard version, and will agree with the claim
that abandoning it would amount to abandoning the Principle of Onto-
logical Determinacy (POD). As a consequence, we recommended that
dialetheists adopt an opposition view of negative truths. This can be char-
acterised as the negation of the tractarian view. It is based on the recog-
nition that some necessities – and therefore some contradictions – are
not truth-functional necessities (contradictions). Parts of the world
which determinately exist (they do NOT existentially oppose each other)
may nonetheless be alethically opposed. This relation is what we have
called: material opposition. As we have seen, opposition views come in
two varieties, depending on whether the co-obtaining opposing facts are
positive (as in Fine’s Fragmentalism) or negative (as in Priest’s Hegelian
account of motion if one adopts the Polarity View of negative truths). 
Should the dialetheist reject these exclusion principles? Arguably not.
First, note that Exclusive-PNC is weaker than plain PNC, for it excludes
less things: precisely the simultaneous co-existence of facts in existential
opposition. We have seen that the dialetheist should better reject that
these contradictions are ever possible. She should therefore accept this for-
mulation of the principle, lest she wants to refuse to use or conceive the
exclusive negations tout court. As noted by Berto, however, the option to
eschew this stronger notion of exclusion altogether is not an advisable ma-
noeuvre for the dialetheist: “If the dialetheist refuses to subscribe to the
characterization of NOT by the intuitive notion of exclusion, she actually
seems to end up as unable to express the exclusion of any position (is she
trying to exclude exclusion?)” (2007: 316) The dialetheist is then well ad-
vised to concede this minor victory. As Grimm (2004: 68) claimed, com-
menting on a negation operator very similar to Berto’s NOT:
One option for the dialetheist is to concede a minor battle and
hold out for victory in a larger way. The victory of the [PNC] ap-
plies only to a particular form of the [PNC] phrased in terms of
that sense of contradiction [that expressed by NOT]. Any defeat
for dialetheism is therefore a minor defeat.
D) What is the disagreement about?
Granted this, what then should the dialetheist reject? We think plausible
that dialetheists should concentrate their limited use of the exclusive
negation to exclude that the tractarian picture of facts is correct. Some-
thing that can be done in many ways. These two are particularly interest-
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ing. She can either exclude the formal characterization of the tractarian
picture itself: ‘It is NOT the case that for all proposition p, not p if and
only if NOT p’; or, equivalently, she can exclude that violations of the
PNC be impossible:
[STRONG-PNC] For any object, it is NOT possible that the same char-
acteristic belong and not belong to it at the same time.
Surely this is a principle that the dialetheist should want to reject.
Once again, the elenchtic defender of the PNC, given her commitment
to a tractarian worldview, will find that there is no difference in content
between this and the standard formulation. But the formulation is inter-
esting because it highlights the extent of the dialetheist’s disagreement. It
is also interesting because it expresses neatly the fact that in a tractarian
world, which makes this principle true by default, there is no logical
space for dialetheias. Moreover, STRONG-PNC encapsulates in one
breath all the three classical laws of thought: PNC, PI and the Excluded
Middle. This is just what scholars have found to be the case of Aristotle’s
formulations of PNC (see Cavini, 2007-8: §2). This indirectly vindicates
the correctness of our characterisation.
E) Are existential diealetheias banished by default?
The dialetheist’s rejection of STRONG-PNC simply signals the possibil-
ity of true contradictions, but it doesn’t tell us which propositions could
actually be made true. All? Could the world be such as to make all propo-
sitions true (trivialism)? It should be clear that we are not asking whether
there are reasons for thinking that trivialism is true. There probably aren’t.
(See Bueno, 2007 for an opinion to the contrary). We are asking if reject-
ing the strict tractarian diet doesn’t commit the dialetheist to a total lib-
eralism about the possibility of dialetheias. To illustrate the problem, con-
sider the case of existential contradictions, e.g. that there are and there
aren’t any Arctic penguins. Could this be a dialetheia? As with any other
contradiction this one could be made true only by two facts. In this case
these will be a positive fact (plausibly the penguins themselves) and a neg-
ative existential fact, i.e. a fact whose existence guarantees that there are
no Arctic penguins. Moreover, these two facts must be able to coexist side
by side in order to make the dialetheia true: they must be in alethic but
not in existential opposition. Now, this is surely repugnant. In what sense
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could the negative existential fact be that particular fact it is (an anti-pen-
guin fact) if it exists next to the Arctic penguins, i.e. next to the very
things that it should guarantee do not exist? It seems that the dialetheist
friend of trumakers will have to live without existential dialetheias. 
However, there are also reasons for thinking the opposite. Suppose
that there was only one red rose left on earth, which happens to be at the
same time also yellow, i.e. it is red and not red. And suppose we were to
claim that there is a red rose. Now, this would be made true by the only
rose that exists, since it is red. But it would also be made false, because
the rose is also not red: the red rose exists and does not exist. Generaliz-
ing, for any predicate involved in a dialetheia, there are objects that fall
and at the same time do not fall within its extension. It seems that if di-
aletheias are possible at all then existential dialetheias must be possible
too. This is puzzling. 
We cannot say of an object that it exists and does not exist, but we can
say that an object that satisfies a given description exists and does not ex-
ist. However, this is only an apparent paradox. As Ayer once said in crit-
icizing the view that existence is a property: “when we ascribe an attribute
to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists: so that if existence were itself
an attribute, it would follow that all positive existential propositions were
tautologies, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory;
and this is not the case” (1936: 26). If the quantificational understanding
of existential propositions is correct, we never say of a thing that it exists,
but always that there is something which satisfies a given description. Ex-
istential dialetheias then do not affirm of an entity that it exists and does
not exist, but that there is an entity that satisfies and does not satisfy the
description. The truth-maker of the proposition that there are elephants
in Africa would not be the elephants themselves, but the fact that certain
entities satisfy the description of an elephant. Analogously, the truth-
maker of the proposition that there are no Arctic penguins is the fact that
entities there don’t satisfy the relevant description. If something were to
determinately satisfy and not satisfy the description, it would be true to
say that Arctic penguins exist and not exist. 
Notice that what needs to exist in order for it to be true that there
are Arctic penguins is a (positive) fact to the effect that certain entities
have the relevant property; and what needs to exist in order for the
proposition to be false, is not the sheer absence of those very same en-
tities, but the existence of a (negative) fact to the effect that the inhab-
itant of the Arctic do not have this property. In short, existential di-
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aletheias are not forbidden in a non tractarian world. Again, what is
forbidden is that some existential claim be true and simultaneously fail
to be true. This would require that the same fact simultaneously exist
and fail to exist. 
Finally, we have said that Priest manifested Meinongian sympathies.
Now, in a Meinongian world existence is a property. Does this jeopardise
our response? No. In a Meinongian world the quantificational concep-
tion applies not to standard existential claims, but to everything that is.
Thus this view escapes from Ayer’s objection: it is not tautological to say
that something exists, because not all that is necessarily exists. Once
again, the only kind of dialetheia that is banished by default is one to the
effect that something simultaneously is and fails to be.
F) The real achievement of elenchtic arguments
At the beginning of this paper we discussed at length the complicated re-
lationship between the PNC and the Principle of Identity (PI). In criti-
cizing Aristotle, we have seen, Łukasiewicz put forward a simple and
sharp argument to show that the two principles are neither synonymous
nor equivalent:
The principle of identity affirms that if [an object] K has b, then
it has b, and if at the same time it does not have b, then it does not
have b. From these propositions one cannot deduce that K cannot
simultaneously have b and not have b.
Indeed, one cannot. And from this simple formal observation alone,
perhaps, one could glimpse the fatal rock over which the Wittgensteinian
project stumbled. If one adopts a wittgensteinian stance, then one is go-
ing to interpret the principle of identity thus:
[Exclusive Principle of Identity] If an object K has b, then it has b, and
if it does NOT have b, then it does NOT have b.
Now, the standard PNC does not follow from this principle (without
assuming the equivalence of ‘NOT’ and ‘not’). What does follow,
though, is the Exclusive PNC, which affirms that K cannot simultane-
ously have and NOT have b. If one assumes the tractarian view of nega-
tive truths, a proposition can be false only if it fails to be true, and it can
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fail to be true only if fails to have a truth-maker. This makes it impossible
for it to be also true, for reasons that should be familiar by now.
As it happened for the exclusive version of PNC, also in this case the
dialetheist should accept this version of the principle. At the level of the
constitution of reality by the facts, this principle affirms that if reality
contains a fact, then it does contain that fact: it does not also fail to con-
tain that same fact. Vice versa, if reality fails to contain a fact, then it does
not also contain it. We have already seen that the dialetheist should com-
mit at least to this version of the Principle of Ontic Determinacy. On
this, we argue, everybody should agree. And this is, in our view, the prop-
er achievement of the elenchtic arguments that we have mentioned.
However, the ambition of elenchtic arguments is to achieve more than
this: they aim and fail at showing that PNC, and not only STRONG-
PNC is universally valid. 
8. Conclusions
The question we asked in this paper was: what must the world be like for
the PNC to be false? The classical answer to this question is that it must
be radically indeterminate. According to these views, the dialetheist
would be committed to deny the POD. It comes as no surprise, then,
that these authors are persuaded by those transcendental arguments that
purport to show the unassailability of PNC by showing the unassailabil-
ity of the POD. 
We agree with these authors that if the POD were to fail, the PNC
would fail too, and that if the PNC were to fail for this reason, then ra-
tional thinking or even the mere possibility to meaningfully talk about
the world would be jeopardised. However, we disagree that this is the only
way in which the PNC might fail. We have argued that a much more
promising ontology for dialetheism – one which appears to have escaped
these authors – is one according to which the world is overdetermined by
containing mutually incoherent facts. In our terminology, these facts are
in material opposition but not in existential opposition: they do deter-
minately coexist. Material oppositions can obtain either between positive
facts (as is the case in Fine’s Fragmentalism), or between a positive and a
negative fact (as in Priest’s account of motion if one adopts his polarity
view of negative facts). 
In a nutshell, we have argued that Dialetheism lives and dies with the
prospects of a positive account of negative truths. 
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